The Consequences of Treating Electricity as a Right

32 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2020

See all articles by Robin Burgess

Robin Burgess

London School of Economics (LSE) - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Michael Greenstone

University of Chicago - Department of Economics; Becker Friedman Institute for Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Nicholas Ryan

Yale University

Anant Sudarshan

University of Chicago

Date Written: February 2020

Abstract

This paper seeks to explain why billions of people in developing countries either have no access to electricity or lack a reliable supply. We present evidence that these shortfalls are a consequence of electricity being treated as a right and that this sets off a vicious four-step circle. In step 1, because a social norm has developed that all deserve power independent of payment, subsidies, theft, and nonpayment are widely tolerated. In step 2, electricity distribution companies lose money with each unit of electricity sold and in total lose large sums of money. In step 3, government-owned distribution companies ration supply to limit losses by restricting access and hours of supply. In step 4, power supply is no longer governed by market forces and the link between payment and supply is severed, thus reducing customers' incentives to pay. The equilibrium outcome is uneven and sporadic access that undermines growth.

Keywords: Electricity distribution

JEL Classification: O3

Suggested Citation

Burgess, Robin and Greenstone, Michael and Ryan, Nicholas and Sudarshan, Anant, The Consequences of Treating Electricity as a Right (February 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14416, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3547349

Robin Burgess (Contact Author)

London School of Economics (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/rburgess/index_own.html

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Michael Greenstone

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Becker Friedman Institute for Economics ( email )

Chicago, IL 60637
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Nicholas Ryan

Yale University ( email )

Anant Sudarshan

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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