Merger-Driven Listing Dynamics

Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth, Research Paper Series, No. 354758

European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 752/2021

78 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2020 Last revised: 27 Jan 2022

See all articles by B. Espen Eckbo

B. Espen Eckbo

Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Markus Lithell

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Finance

Date Written: January 20, 2022

Abstract

We measure the degree to which stock exchanges around the world attract and retain firms under public ownership by adjusting actual listing counts for targets of public acquirers. In the U.S., where these targets exceed the number of IPOs, our merger-adjustment eliminates both the dramatic (50%) post-1996 listing decline, and the relative international listing gap reported elsewhere. We also show that listing peaks followed by rapid declines are surprisingly common internationally. However, while the post-peak decline in the U.S. primarily reflects mergers between public firms, declines elsewhere to a greater extent reflect de facto stock-exchange exits.

Keywords: M&A, merger, public listing, listing peak, listing gap

JEL Classification: G15, G34

Suggested Citation

Eckbo, B. Espen and Lithell, Markus, Merger-Driven Listing Dynamics (January 20, 2022). Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth, Research Paper Series, No. 354758, European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 752/2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3547581 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547581

B. Espen Eckbo (Contact Author)

Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-3953 (Phone)
603-646-3805 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://tuck.dartmouth.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/b-espen-eckbo

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Markus Lithell

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Finance ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5045 Bergen
Norway

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