Real-time Monitoring in a Public-Goods Game

54 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 2020 Last revised: 3 Apr 2023

See all articles by Simin He

Simin He

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Economics

Xun Zhu

Fudan University - School of Management

Date Written: March 31, 2023

Abstract

We investigate a novel continuous-time mechanism in a public-goods game. In this game, a clock ensures that the contributions regularly increase within a fixed period for each player. The players can choose when to stop their contributions from increasing while others observe their actions in real time. We demonstrate, theoretically and experimentally, that such a mechanism effectively improves contributions. Three critical factors could cause improvement: announcements, incremental commitments, and the clock. We further decompose these factors and find that while announcements alone are ineffective, introducing incremental commitments and the clock can significantly improve contributions.

Keywords: public goods, continuous time, incremental commitment, cheap talk

JEL Classification: C72, C92, D82

Suggested Citation

He, Simin and Zhu, Xun, Real-time Monitoring in a Public-Goods Game (March 31, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3548418 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3548418

Simin He (Contact Author)

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Economics ( email )

777 Guoding Road
Shanghai, 200433
China

Xun Zhu

Fudan University - School of Management ( email )

Shanghai
China

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