Persuading Strategic Voters

32 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2020

See all articles by Toygar T. Kerman

Toygar T. Kerman

Corvinus University of Budapest

P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Tilburg University

Dominik Karos

Maastricht University

Date Written: January 16, 2020

Abstract

A Sender wants to persuade multiple Receivers with homogeneous preferences and a common belief about the state of the world to vote in favor of a proposal. Prior to the vote Sender commits to a communication strategy which sends private, potentially correlated, signals to Receivers that are contingent on the true state of the world. While Sender benefits from using private messages rather than public communication if Receivers vote sincerely, under the optimal communication strategy, sincere voting is not in any Receiver’s best interest. If the proposal does not require unanimous agreement, Sender’s optimal communication strategy after which sincere voting indeed constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is such that no voter is ever pivotal.

Keywords: Bayesian, Persuasion, Strategic Voting, Swing Voter's Curse

JEL Classification: C72, D72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Kerman, Toygar T. and Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and Karos, Dominik, Persuading Strategic Voters (January 16, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550071 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3550071

Toygar T. Kerman

Corvinus University of Budapest ( email )

Budapest
Hungary

P. Jean-Jacques Herings (Contact Author)

Tilburg University ( email )

Department of Econometrics and Operations Research
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 4668797 (Phone)
5000 LE (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/jean-jacques-herings/home

Dominik Karos

Maastricht University ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, Limburg 6200MD
Netherlands

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