Stability vs. No Justified Envy

13 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2020

See all articles by Assaf Romm

Assaf Romm

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics; Stanford University

Alvin E. Roth

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ran I. Shorrer

Pennsylvania State University

Date Written: March 6, 2020

Abstract

Stability and "no justified envy" are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justified envy.

Keywords: Stability, no justified envy, fairness

JEL Classification: D47, C78, D71

Suggested Citation

Romm, Assaf and Roth, Alvin E. and Shorrer, Ran I., Stability vs. No Justified Envy (March 6, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550122 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3550122

Assaf Romm

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905
Israel

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Alvin E. Roth

Dept. of Economics, Stanford University ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
STANFORD, CA 94305-6072
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Ran I. Shorrer (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park
State College, PA 16802
United States

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