How Do Design-Thinking and Agents' Roles Matter to Generate Predictive Knowledge in Organizations?

50 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2020 Last revised: 28 Sep 2023

See all articles by Giulia Solinas

Giulia Solinas

Institute for Strategy, Technology and Organizations; LMU Munich

Dennis Verhoeven

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology; KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB); London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Date Written: September 27, 2023

Abstract

This study explores how organizational design and agents' roles affect the ability to generate predictive knowledge necessary for achieving strategic goals in dynamic organizational environments. Through an analysis of 20 cases in the IP value chain of large organizations, we discovered that decision-makers can effectively use a combination of hierarchical and horizontal coordination mechanisms. Additionally, we identified four distinct roles played by agents in shaping predictive knowledge. This study presents a new framework that emphasizes the interplay between organizational design and agent contributions, advancing our understanding of predictive knowledge generation in complex settings. Our findings provide valuable insights for optimizing the strategic design of critical organizational functions, such as the IP value chain, which can impact innovation and competitiveness.

Keywords: interdependencies, organization design, coordination, fs/QCA

JEL Classification: M10, O32, O33

Suggested Citation

Solinas, Giulia and Verhoeven, Dennis, How Do Design-Thinking and Agents' Roles Matter to Generate Predictive Knowledge in Organizations? (September 27, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3551991 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551991

Giulia Solinas (Contact Author)

Institute for Strategy, Technology and Organizations; LMU Munich ( email )

Germany

Dennis Verhoeven

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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