Coordination Mechanisms and Value Appropriation: Toward a Configurational Perspective

50 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2020

See all articles by Giulia Solinas

Giulia Solinas

Institute for Strategy, Technology and Organizations; LMU Munich

Dennis Verhoeven

ICRIOS, Bocconi; KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB); London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Date Written: March 10, 2020

Abstract

The issue of value appropriation from innovation is a centerpiece of firms’ innovation strategies. Appropriability through successful patent protection occurs due to a hierarchical structure in the R&D decision-making, a certain level of cross-functionality between the organizational units involved, and the codification of information in the application process. However, the interaction between these coordination mechanisms remains open to debate. This study explores this interplay by adopting a configurational perspective and analyzing 20 cases using the fs/QCA approach. Our findings explore the synergies derived from the intersection of coordination mechanisms for appropriability and identify which are core versus peripheral. The results suggest that centralizing both decision-making and cross-functionality are core to appropriability when combined in an organization. However, both mechanisms become ancillary when in a configuration with formalization through planning.

Keywords: Appropriability, coordination, innovation, patents, fs/QCA

JEL Classification: M10, O32, O33

Suggested Citation

Solinas, Giulia and Verhoeven, Dennis, Coordination Mechanisms and Value Appropriation: Toward a Configurational Perspective (March 10, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3551991 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551991

Giulia Solinas (Contact Author)

Institute for Strategy, Technology and Organizations; LMU Munich ( email )

Germany

Dennis Verhoeven

ICRIOS, Bocconi ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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