Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments

Posted: 13 Dec 2002

See all articles by Kong-Pin Chen

Kong-Pin Chen

Academia Sinica - Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences; National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

Abstract

The paper studies the nature, determinants, and impact of negative activities in organizations. In competing for promotion, the members in organizations can work not only to enhance their own performances, but also to 'sabotage' their opponent's performances. It is worthwhile for them to engage in negative activities because promotion is generally based on relative, rather than absolute, performance, and its nature is winner-take-all. We find that abler members are subject to more attacks. Consequently, not only is there a double inefficiency in effort, but also members of the highest caliber might not have the best chance of being promoted. Finally, we discuss several institutional designs that might help to reduce the influence of negative activities.

Suggested Citation

Chen, Kong-Pin, Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 119-140, 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=355302

Kong-Pin Chen (Contact Author)

Academia Sinica - Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

RCHSS
Academia Sinica
Nankang, Taipei, 11529
Taiwan
886 2 2789 8160 (Phone)
886 2 2785 4160 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://idv.sinica.edu.tw/kongpin/

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

21 Hsiu Chow Rd
Taipei, 10020
Taiwan

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