Sacrificing Legitimacy in a Hierarchical Judiciary

56 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2020 Last revised: 14 Jan 2021

See all articles by Tara Leigh Grove

Tara Leigh Grove

University of Alabama School of Law

Date Written: January 13, 2021

Abstract

Scholars have long worried about the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. But commentators have largely overlooked the inferior federal judiciary—and the potential tradeoffs between Supreme Court and lower court legitimacy. This Essay aims to call attention to those tradeoffs. When the Justices are asked to change the law in high-profile areas—such as abortion, affirmative action, or gun rights—they face a conundrum: To protect the legitimacy of the Court, the Justices may be reluctant to issue the broad precedents that will most effectively clarify the law—and thereby guide the lower courts. The Justices may instead opt for narrow doctrines or deny review altogether. But such an approach puts tremendous pressure on the lower courts, which must take the lead on the content of federal law in these high-profile areas. Presidents, senators, and interest groups then zero in on the composition of the lower courts—in ways that threaten the long-term legitimacy of the inferior federal judiciary. Drawing on political science and history, this Essay explores these legitimacy tradeoffs within our federal judicial hierarchy. To the extent that our legal system aims to protect the legitimacy of the judiciary, we should consider not simply the Supreme Court but the entire federal bench.

Keywords: legitmacy, judicial hierarchy, judicial appointments, minimalism, passive virtues

Suggested Citation

Grove, Tara Leigh, Sacrificing Legitimacy in a Hierarchical Judiciary (January 13, 2021). 121 Columbia Law Review, Forthcoming 2021, U of Alabama Legal Studies Research Paper No. 3554027, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3554027

Tara Leigh Grove (Contact Author)

University of Alabama School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 870382
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

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