We Who are Not as Others: Sanctions and (Global) Security Governance

The Oxford Handbook on the International Law of Global Security, pp. 773-788, Robin Geiß and Nils Melzer, eds, Oxford University Press, 2020

Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12/2020

14 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2020 Last revised: 6 Mar 2023

Date Written: February 16, 2020

Abstract

This paper deals with sanctions as a (global) security governance tool. It discusses the terms of the debate—the meaning of sanctions and (global) security and then traces the historical trajectory in the use of collective and unilateral sanctions in the service of security. The argument is that global security is nothing but national security projected unto the international plane. When a hegemonic concept of security, that is to say, of the existential threats ‘we’ need to protect against is imposed and accepted, and for as long as it is accepted, collective sanctions rule supreme, and can be particularly effective (but also destructive). When there is fragmentation and antagonism as to what the threats are, when there is no hegemonic national security accepted as synonymous to international security, there is a return to unilateral sanctions and a concomitant side-lining of collective security mechanisms.

Keywords: sanctions, countermeasures, global security, national security, international security, UN sanctions, collective measures, unilateral measures

Suggested Citation

Tzanakopoulos, Antonios, We Who are Not as Others: Sanctions and (Global) Security Governance (February 16, 2020). The Oxford Handbook on the International Law of Global Security, pp. 773-788, Robin Geiß and Nils Melzer, eds, Oxford University Press, 2020, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12/2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3554278

Antonios Tzanakopoulos (Contact Author)

University of Oxford ( email )

St. Cross Building
St. Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UJ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/people/antonios-tzanakopoulos

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