European Union and Transnational Terrorism. A Normative Analysis of Strategic Spillovers

21 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2020 Last revised: 20 Apr 2020

See all articles by Mario Gilli

Mario Gilli

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Paolo Tedeschi

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS)

Date Written: March 16, 2020

Abstract

There are two main categories of antiterrorism policies - active and defensive. Active measures target the terrorists directly, and by weakening their ability to operate, are a sort of public good. On the other hand, defensive measures try to protect a potential target. Unilateral defensive measures can induce terrorists to substitute one target for another, in particular a foreign one. These positive and negative externalities of different antiterrorism measures raise the question of the best institutional setting for countries cooperation. This paper studies how in democratic countries public opinion and past intelligence proactive policies affect the efficiency of counterterrorism defensive policies according to different institutional scenarios regulating cooperation among countries. The aim of the paper is to study the consequences of four different scenarios on the choice of defensive policies: full decentralization, intelligence cooperation, unanimous political cooperation, such as the European Union for security policies, and full political union, the first best solution. The main result is that intelligence cooperation reduces the possibility of inefficient defensive policies more than unanimous political cooperation, a case of second best theory.

Suggested Citation

Gilli, Mario and Tedeschi, Paolo, European Union and Transnational Terrorism. A Normative Analysis of Strategic Spillovers (March 16, 2020). University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper No. 437, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3554937 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3554937

Mario Gilli (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Paolo Tedeschi

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

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