A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confidence in Science With An Application to the Public Goods Game

61 Pages Posted: 8 May 2020

See all articles by Luigi Butera

Luigi Butera

Copenhagen Business School

Philip J. Grossman

Monash University - Department of Economics

Daniel Houser

Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE - CNRS; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: March 20, 2020

Abstract

Recently a credibility crisis has taken hold across the social sciences, arguing that a component of Fischer (1935)’s tripod has not been fully embraced: replication. The importance of replications is not debatable scientifically, but researchers’ incentives are not sufficient to encourage replications. We analyze a novel mechanism promoting replications through beneficial gains between scholars and editors. We highlight the tradeoffs involved in seeking independent replications before submission to journals, and demonstrate the operation of this method via an investigation of the effects of Knightian uncertainty on cooperation in public goods games, a pervasive but largely unexplored feature in the literature.

Keywords: Replication, science, public goods, uncertainty, experiment

JEL Classification: A11, C18, C92, D82

Suggested Citation

Butera, Luigi and Grossman, Philip J. and Houser, Daniel and Villeval, Marie Claire, A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confidence in Science With An Application to the Public Goods Game (March 20, 2020). GMU Working Paper in Economics Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3557796 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3557796

Luigi Butera (Contact Author)

Copenhagen Business School ( email )

Denmark

Philip J. Grossman

Monash University - Department of Economics ( email )

Wellington Road
Clayton, 3800
Australia
61399020052 (Phone)

Daniel Houser

Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science ( email )

5th Floor, Vernon Smith Hall
George Mason University
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
7039934856 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~dhouser/

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE - CNRS ( email )

35 rue Raulin
LYON, 69007
France
+33 688314656 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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