How Do Disclosure Repetition and Interactivity Influence Investors’ Judgments?

48 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2020 Last revised: 28 Nov 2020

See all articles by Nerissa C. Brown

Nerissa C. Brown

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Brian Gale

University of Washington

Stephanie M. Grant

University of Washington

Date Written: November 27, 2020

Abstract

Recent regulatory amendments aimed at modernizing disclosures and enhancing their usefulness focus on repetition and interactivity within firms’ disclosure filings. We use two experiments to provide evidence on the effects of disclosure repetition (repeating of information in the filing) and disclosure interactivity (user involvement in directing the form or content of the information displayed) on investors’ information processing and investment judgments. Results show that when the filing is less interactive, repetition reduces investors’ processing of other, non-repeated information. This evidence corroborates concerns that repetition can obscure value-relevant information from investors. However, we find that more interactive disclosures mitigate this harmful effect of repetition on investors’ processing of non-repeated information. Thus, our evidence suggests that disclosure interactivity is an important disclosure attribute that counteracts the potentially harmful effects of repetition on investors' processing of non-repeated information and influences investment judgments in a corresponding manner.

Keywords: repetition; interactivity; information processing; investment judgments

JEL Classification: M41; G11; G14; C91; D83

Suggested Citation

Brown, Nerissa C. and Gale, Brian and Grant, Stephanie M., How Do Disclosure Repetition and Interactivity Influence Investors’ Judgments? (November 27, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3557891 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3557891

Nerissa C. Brown

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

Brian Gale

University of Washington ( email )

Box 353200
Seattle, WA 91895
United States

Stephanie M. Grant (Contact Author)

University of Washington ( email )

Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States
(206) 543-2904 (Phone)

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