Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics

50 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2002

See all articles by Daron Acemoglu

Daron Acemoglu

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: November 19, 2002

Abstract

Do societies choose inefficient policies and institutions, in contrast to what would be suggested by a reasoning extending the Coase Theorem to politics? Do societies choose inefficient policies and institutions because of differences in the beliefs and ideologies of their peoples or leaders? Or are inefficiencies in politics and economics the outcome of social and distributional conflicts? This paper discusses these various approaches to political economy, and develops the argument that there are strong empirical and theoretical grounds for believing that inefficient policies and institutions are prevalent, and that they are chosen because they serve the interests of politicians or social groups holding political power, at the expense of the society at large. At the center of the theoretical case are the commitment problems inherent in politics: parties holding political power cannot make commitments to bind their future actions because there is no outside agency with the coercive capacity to enforce such arrangements.

Keywords: Political Economy, Institutions, Commitment, Social Conflict, Belief Differences, Appropriate Institutions, Economic Development, Colonialism

JEL Classification: H2, N10, N40, O1

Suggested Citation

Acemoglu, Daron, Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics (November 19, 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=355900 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.355900

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