Rulers or Rules? International Law, Elite Cues and Public Opinion

European Journal of International Law, 2020 Forthcoming

U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 20-06

26 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2020

See all articles by Anton Strezhnev

Anton Strezhnev

Harvard University - Department of Government

Beth A. Simmons

University of Pennsylvania

Matthew Kim

Harvard Law School; Harvard Government Department; Harvard Institute for Quantitative Social Science

Date Written: Juy 25, 2019

Abstract

One of the mechanisms by which international law can shape domestic politics is through its effects on public opinion. However, a growing number of national leaders have begun to advocate policies that ignore or even deny international law constraints. This article investigates whether international law messages can still shift public opinion even in the face of countervailing elite cues. It reports results from survey experiments conducted in three countries, the United States, Australia and India, which examined attitudes on a highly salient domestic political issue: restrictions on refugee admissions. In each experimental vignette, respondents were asked about their opinion on a proposed or ongoing restrictive refugee policy that was endorsed by the government but also likely contravened international refugee law. Respondents were randomly exposed to messages highlighting the policy’s illegality and/or the elite endorsement. The results show that, on average, the international law messages had a small but significant persuasive effect in reducing support for the restrictive policy – at most 10 percentage points. Surprisingly, there was no evidence that the countervailing elite endorsement was a significant moderator of this effect. However, in the case of the United States and among Republican co-partisans of the President, the elite endorsement independently increased respondents’ beliefs that the restriction was legal under international law while having no effect on support for the policy. The results suggest that cues from domestic elites do not strictly trump those from international sources and that despite cues about national leaders’ policy advocacy, international law can affect the attitudes of some voters even on an issue as heavily politicized as refugee policy.

Keywords: International law, political science, domestic politics, national leaders, elite rulers, national policy conflicts with international law, international refugee law messages’ effect on public opinion, messages from domestic elites do not strictly trump those from international sources

Suggested Citation

Strezhnev, Anton and Simmons, Beth A. and Kim, Matthew, Rulers or Rules? International Law, Elite Cues and Public Opinion (Juy 25, 2019). European Journal of International Law, 2020 Forthcoming; U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 20-06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559507

Anton Strezhnev

Harvard University - Department of Government ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://scholar.harvard.edu/astrezhnev

Beth A. Simmons (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

3501Sansom
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
7817990076 (Phone)

Matthew Kim

Harvard Law School ( email )

1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Harvard Government Department ( email )

1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Harvard Institute for Quantitative Social Science ( email )

1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02115
United States

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