Migration between Platforms

48 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2020

See all articles by Gary Biglaiser

Gary Biglaiser

University of North Carolina

Jacques Crémer

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Andre Veiga

Imperial College London

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2020


We study incumbency advantage in markets with positive consumption externalities. Users of an incumbent platform receive stochastic opportunities to migrate to an entrant. They can accept a migration opportunity or wait for a future opportunity. In some circumstances, users have incentives to delay migration until others have migrated. If they all do so, no migration takes place, even when migration would have been Pareto-superior. This provides an endogenous micro-foundation for incumbency advantage. We use our framework to identify environments where incumbency advantage is larger.

Keywords: industry dynamics, migration, Platform, Standardization and Compatibility

JEL Classification: D85, L14, L15, L16, R23

Suggested Citation

Biglaiser, Gary and Crémer, Jacques and Veiga, Andre, Migration between Platforms (March 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14496, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3560304

Gary Biglaiser (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina ( email )

Chapel Hill, NC 27599
United States
919-966-4884 (Phone)
919-966-4986 (Fax)

Jacques Crémer

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042

Andre Veiga

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

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