Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite

55 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2020

See all articles by Alma Cohen

Alma Cohen

Harvard Law School; Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Moshe Hazan

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

David Weiss

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2020

Abstract

This study investigates whether CEOs' political preferences are associated with the representation and compensation of women among non-CEO top executives at U.S. public companies. We find that CEOs who more strongly identify with the Republican party are associated with fewer women in the executive suite. To explore causality, we use an event study approach to show that replacing a Republican with a Democratic CEO increases female representation in the executive suite. Finally, gender gaps in the level and performance-sensitivity of compensation are larger under Republican CEOs. Our results are consistent with no such gaps existing in companies run by Democratic CEOs.

JEL Classification: G30, J16, J30, J33, J71, K00, M12, M14, M51, M52

Suggested Citation

Cohen, Alma and Hazan, Moshe and Weiss, David, Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite (March 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14513, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3560321

Alma Cohen (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 496-4099 (Phone)
(617) 812-0554 (Fax)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Moshe Hazan

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 6997801
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://www.moshehazan.sites.tau.ac.il/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

David Weiss

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

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