Pick-an-object Mechanisms

45 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2020

See all articles by Inácio Bó

Inácio Bó

Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) - China Center for Behavior Economics and Finance

Rustamdjan Hakimov

WZB Berlin Social Science Center; University of Lausanne

Date Written: September 7, 2020


We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, denoted pick-an-object (PAO) mechanisms. When implementing an allocation rule via PAO, agents are asked to pick an object from individualized menus. These choices may be rejected later on, and these agents are presented with new menus. When the procedure ends, agents are assigned the last object they picked. We characterize the allocation rules that can be sequentialized by PAO mechanisms, as well as the ones that can be implemented in a robust truthful equilibrium. We justify the use of PAO as opposed to direct mechanisms by showing that its equilibrium behavior is closely related to the one in obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms, but includes commonly used rules, such as Gale-Shapley DA and Top Trading Cycles, which are not OSP-implementable. We run laboratory experiments comparing truthful behavior when using PAO, OSP, and direct mechanisms to implement different rules. These indicate that individuals are more likely to behave in line with the theoretical prediction under PAO and OSP implementations than their direct counterparts.

Keywords: Market Design, Matching, Sequential Mechanisms, Experiments, obvious strategy-proofness

JEL Classification: C78, C73, D78, D82

Suggested Citation

Bó, Inácio and Hakimov, Rustamdjan and Hakimov, Rustamdjan, Pick-an-object Mechanisms (September 7, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract= or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3560372

Inácio Bó (Contact Author)

Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) - China Center for Behavior Economics and Finance ( email )

Liutai Road 555

HOME PAGE: http://www.inaciobo.com

Rustamdjan Hakimov

WZB Berlin Social Science Center ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin, 10785

University of Lausanne ( email )

Quartier Chambronne
Lausanne, 1016

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics