Pick-an-object Mechanisms

66 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2020

See all articles by Inácio Bó

Inácio Bó

University of York - Department of Economics and Related Studies

Rustamdjan Hakimov

WZB Berlin Social Science Center; University of Lausanne

Date Written: March 1, 2020

Abstract

We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, denoted pick-an-object (PAO) mechanisms. When implementing an allocation rule via PAO, agents are asked to pick an object from individualized menus. These choices may be rejected later on, and these agents are presented with new menus. When the procedure ends, agents are assigned the last object they picked. We characterize the allocation rules that can be sequentialized by PAO mechanisms, as well as the ones that can be implemented in a robust truthful equilibrium. We justify the use of PAO as opposed to direct mechanisms by showing that its equilibrium behavior is closely related to the one in obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms, while expanding the domain of rules that can be implemented to include commonly used ones, such as Gale-Shapley DA and Top Trading Cycles. We run laboratory experiments comparing truthful behavior when using PAO, OSP, and direct mechanisms to implement different rules. These indicate that individuals are more likely to behave in line with the theoretical prediction under PAO and OSP implementations than their direct counterparts.

Keywords: Market Design, Matching, Sequential Mechanisms, Experiments, obvious strategy-proofness

JEL Classification: C78, C73, D78, D82

Suggested Citation

Bó, Inácio and Hakimov, Rustamdjan, Pick-an-object Mechanisms (March 1, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract= or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3560372

Inácio Bó (Contact Author)

University of York - Department of Economics and Related Studies ( email )

Heslington
York, YO1 5DD
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.inaciobo.com

Rustamdjan Hakimov

WZB Berlin Social Science Center ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin, 10785
Germany

University of Lausanne ( email )

Quartier Chambronne
Lausanne, 1016
Switzerland

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