Game of Prejudice: Experiments at the Extensive and Intensive Margin

44 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 2020

See all articles by Utteeyo Dasgupta

Utteeyo Dasgupta

Wagner College-Department of Economics

Subha Mani

Fordham University - Fordham College at Rose Hill

Joe Vecci

Gothenburg University

Tomáš Želinský

Charles University in Prague

Abstract

In an unique lab-in-the-field experiment we design a novel labor market environment, the Game of Prejudice, to elicit preferences for discrimination towards the largest minority group in Europe (the Roma) at the intensive margins as well as at the extensive margins. Our unique experiment design allows us to separate taste-based discrimination from statistical discrimination and examine the impacts of raising the costs of discrimination in such situations. We find discrimination to be commonplace at both margins, with stronger incidence at the extensive margin. We also find higher incidence of taste-based discrimination compared to statistical discrimination. Importantly, we find that when the cost of taste-based discrimination is made sufficiently high, such behavior disappears at the intensive and extensive margins, providing support for labor market policies that make discrimination very costly for the employer.

Keywords: discrimination, extensive margin, intensive margin, lab-in-the field experiment, Slovakia

JEL Classification: C9, D3, I1, O1

Suggested Citation

Dasgupta, Utteeyo and Mani, Subha and Vecci, Joe and Želinský, Tomáš, Game of Prejudice: Experiments at the Extensive and Intensive Margin. IZA Discussion Paper No. 13085. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3562875

Utteeyo Dasgupta (Contact Author)

Wagner College-Department of Economics ( email )

Staten Island, NY 10301
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/utteeyodasgupta/

Subha Mani

Fordham University - Fordham College at Rose Hill ( email )

United States

Joe Vecci

Gothenburg University ( email )

Sweden
767851248 (Phone)

Tomáš Želinský

Charles University in Prague ( email )

Celetná 13
Praha 1, 116 36
Czech Republic

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