Partial Market Liberalization and the Efficiency of Policy Reform: The Case of the European Dairy Sector

18 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2020

See all articles by Zohra Bouamra‐Mechemache

Zohra Bouamra‐Mechemache

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Jean‐Paul Chavas

University of Maryland

Thomas L. Cox

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics

Vincent Réquillart

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: November 2002

Abstract

This article analyzes the efficiency of partial market liberalization and policy reform with an application to the European dairy sector. In a second best world, partial moves toward market liberalization are not always efficiency improving. We develop a general equilibrium model to investigate the efficiency implications of discrete changes in government policy. The analysis covers price and quantity instruments used in both domestic and trade policy. We derive simple cnditions under which partial market liberalization is efficiency improving. We apply the approach to agricultural policy reform in the European dairy sector and identify market liberalization scenarios that are “not” efficiency improving.

Keywords: dairy, efficiency, European Union, market liberalization, policy reform, Q180

Suggested Citation

Bouamra‐Mechemache, Zohra and Chavas, Jean‐Paul and Cox, Thomas L. and Réquillart, Vincent, Partial Market Liberalization and the Efficiency of Policy Reform: The Case of the European Dairy Sector (November 2002). American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 84, Issue 4, pp. 1003-1020, 2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3565418 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8276.00363

Zohra Bouamra‐Mechemache (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Jean‐Paul Chavas

University of Maryland

Thomas L. Cox

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics ( email )

427 Lorch St.
Madison, WI 53706-1503
United States
608-262-9493 (Phone)

Vincent Réquillart

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

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