Investment and Information Acquisition

46 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2020

See all articles by Dimitri Migrow

Dimitri Migrow

University of Calgary

Sergei Severinov

University of British Columbia; National Research University Higher School of Economics

Date Written: March 28, 2020

Abstract

We study the interaction between productive investment and persuasion activities in a principal-agent setting with strategic disclosure. In an attempt to persuade the principal, the agent diverts substantial resources from productive activities to information acquisition for persuasion, even though productive activities are more efficient and raise the chances of success in persuasion. We show that a higher cost of an investment project results in a lower productive investment. We further demonstrate how a commitment by the agent to disclose all acquired information, or a commitment by the principal to a decision rule, curtail the inefficiency and stimulate productive investment.

Keywords: information acquisition, persuasion, strategic disclosure, investment

JEL Classification: D24, D82, D83, M31

Suggested Citation

Migrow, Dimitri and Severinov, Sergei, Investment and Information Acquisition (March 28, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3565503 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3565503

Sergei Severinov

University of British Columbia ( email )

2329 West Mall
Vancouver, British Columbia BC V6T 1Z4
Canada

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
37
Abstract Views
317
PlumX Metrics