Hipster Antitrust: New Bottles, Same Old W(h)ine?

CPI Antitrust Chronicle, April 2018

U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 20-25

6 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2020

See all articles by Christopher S. Yoo

Christopher S. Yoo

University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania - Annenberg School for Communication; University of Pennsylvania - School of Engineering and Applied Science

Date Written: April 2018

Abstract

Although the debate over hipster antitrust is often portrayed as something new, experienced observers recognize it as a replay of an old argument that was resolved by the global consensus that antitrust should focus on consumer welfare rather than on the size of firms, the levels of industry concentration, and other considerations. Moreover, the history of the Federal Trade Commission’s Section 5 authority to prevent unfair methods of competition stands as a reminder of the dangers of allowing enforcement policy to be guided by vague and uncertain standards.

Keywords: Competition law & policy, law & economics, legal history, movement antitrust, consumer welfare standard, Sherman Antitrust Act, market power, Federal Trade Commission, FTC

JEL Classification: B21, K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Yoo, Christopher S., Hipster Antitrust: New Bottles, Same Old W(h)ine? (April 2018). CPI Antitrust Chronicle, April 2018, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 20-25, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567928

Christopher S. Yoo (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204
United States
(215) 746-8772 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/csyoo/

University of Pennsylvania - Annenberg School for Communication ( email )

3620 Walnut St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6220
United States
(215) 746-8772 (Phone)

University of Pennsylvania - School of Engineering and Applied Science ( email )

3330 Walnut St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6309
United States
(215) 746-8772 (Phone)

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