Call Me by Your Name: The Effect of Analyst-CEO First Name Commonality on Analyst Forecast Accuracy

38 Pages Posted: 8 May 2020 Last revised: 26 Feb 2022

See all articles by Omri Even-Tov

Omri Even-Tov

Haas School of Business - UC Berkeley

Kanyuan (Kevin) Huang

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Anderson School of Management, Students

Brett Trueman

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management

Jon Bogard

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Anderson School of Management, Students

Date Written: January 21, 2022

Abstract

We document that earnings forecasts of security analysts sharing a first name with the firm’s CEO (‘matched’ analysts) are more accurate than those of analysts who do not (‘unmatched’ analysts). This result is consistent with findings in psychology which show that individuals have an affinity for those who share first names, which can manifest itself in the CEO sharing private information with a matched analyst and/or in the matched analyst exerting more effort to forecast the firm’s earnings. We find this phenomenon to be concentrated among matched analysts with less common first names, perhaps because the salience of sharing a first name is lower for analysts with more common names. We also find that the observed forecasting superiority of matched analysts declines the longer the match has been in effect, suggesting that the benefit of sharing a first name diminishes as analysts gain more experience in forecasting a firm’s earnings.

Keywords: security analysts, earnings forecast accuracy, first names

JEL Classification: G14, G24, G40, M41

Suggested Citation

Even-Tov, Omri and Huang, Kanyuan and Trueman, Brett and Bogard, Jonathan, Call Me by Your Name: The Effect of Analyst-CEO First Name Commonality on Analyst Forecast Accuracy (January 21, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3569247 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3569247

Omri Even-Tov

Haas School of Business - UC Berkeley ( email )

Haas School of Business
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
3104302236 (Phone)

Kanyuan Huang

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Anderson School of Management, Students ( email )

Los Angeles, CA
United States

Brett Trueman (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-4720 (Phone)
310-267-2193 (Fax)

Jonathan Bogard

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Anderson School of Management, Students ( email )

Los Angeles, CA
United States

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