Call Me by Your Name: The Effect of Analyst-CEO First Name Commonality on Analyst Forecast Accuracy

41 Pages Posted: 8 May 2020

See all articles by Omri Even-Tov

Omri Even-Tov

Haas School of Business - UC Berkeley

Kanyuan (Kevin) Huang

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Anderson School of Management, Students

Brett Trueman

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management

Date Written: April 5, 2020

Abstract

In this paper we document that the earnings forecasts of security analysts who share a first name with the CEO of a covered firm (referred to as ‘matched’ analysts) are more accurate, on average, than those of analysts who do not share a first name (referred to as ‘unmatched’ analysts). This result is consistent with findings in psychology which show that individuals have an affinity for those who share first names and suggests that the CEO is more likely to share private information with a matched analyst. We find this phenomenon to be concentrated among those matched analysts with less common first names, perhaps because the salience of sharing a first name is lower for analysts with more common names. It is also stronger in situations where there is greater information asymmetry between management and analysts.

Keywords: security analysts, earnings forecast accuracy, first names

JEL Classification: G14, G24, G40, M41

Suggested Citation

Even-Tov, Omri and Huang, Kanyuan and Trueman, Brett, Call Me by Your Name: The Effect of Analyst-CEO First Name Commonality on Analyst Forecast Accuracy (April 5, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3569247 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3569247

Omri Even-Tov

Haas School of Business - UC Berkeley ( email )

Haas School of Business
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
3104302236 (Phone)

Kanyuan Huang

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Anderson School of Management, Students ( email )

Los Angeles, CA
United States

Brett Trueman (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-4720 (Phone)
310-267-2193 (Fax)

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