Structural vs. Behavioural Remedies

Maier-Rigaud, F. and B. Loertscher (2020) Structural vs. Behavioural Remedies, Competition Policy International, Forthcoming

11 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2020

See all articles by Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

ABC economics; IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods

Benjamin Lörtscher

NERA Economic Consulting

Date Written: April 6, 2020

Abstract

The European Commission’s remedial practice displays important differences in the type of remedies accepted in merger as opposed to antitrust cases. This paper briefly reviews the Commission’s remedies practice over the last 14 years highlighting the differences and discussing inconsistencies. It raises the question why predominantly behavioural remedies are chosen in antitrust cases and how this practice could be reconciled with the approach in merger control where the risks to effective competition are viewed as deriving from changes in the structure of the market and where therefore structural remedies are typically considered necessary.

Keywords: structural remedies, behavioural remedies, Article 7, Article 9, Merger remedies, access remedies, evolution of remedies, remedies practice, European Commission, consistency of remedies

JEL Classification: K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P. and Lörtscher, Benjamin, Structural vs. Behavioural Remedies (April 6, 2020). Maier-Rigaud, F. and B. Loertscher (2020) Structural vs. Behavioural Remedies, Competition Policy International, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3569642

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud (Contact Author)

ABC economics ( email )

Berlin, 10115
Germany
10115 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ABCecon.com

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods ( email )

Socle de la Grande Arche
1 Parvis de la Défense
Paris, La Défense Cedex, 92044
France

Benjamin Lörtscher

NERA Economic Consulting ( email )

50 Main Street, 14th Floor
White Plains, NY 10606
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
111
Abstract Views
302
rank
285,858
PlumX Metrics