Do Inheritance Rules Affect Voter Turnout? Evidence from an Alpine Region

33 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2020

See all articles by Andrea Bonoldi

Andrea Bonoldi

University of Trento - Department of Economics and Management

Chiara Dalle Nogare

University of Brescia - Department of Economics and Management

Martin Mosler

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Niklas Potrafke

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: 2020

Abstract

We examine the relationship between inheritance rules and voter turnout. Inheritance rules are measured by entailed farms in South Tyrol: land properties whose inheritance is regulated by a law similar to the right of primogeniture. Using data for municipalities between 1998 and 2010, we show that voter turnout is high in municipalities with many entailed farms relative to population. The effect is based on local elections. If the number of entailed farms per 100 inhabitants increases by one standard deviation, voting turnout in municipal and provincial elections increases by around 1.27 and 1.43 percentage points (around 25 and 35 percent of a standard deviation). Our results suggest that entailed farm owners themselves are more likely to vote, and that entailed farms owners encourage other citizens of their municipality to participate in local elections.

Keywords: entailed farms, voter turnout, inheritance rules, identity, civic duty

JEL Classification: D720, H700, K110, Q150, Z190

Suggested Citation

Bonoldi, Andrea and Nogare, Chiara Dalle and Mosler, Martin and Potrafke, Niklas, Do Inheritance Rules Affect Voter Turnout? Evidence from an Alpine Region (2020). CESifo Working Paper No. 8192, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3570295

Andrea Bonoldi (Contact Author)

University of Trento - Department of Economics and Management ( email )

Via Inama 5
Trento, I-38100
Italy

Chiara Dalle Nogare

University of Brescia - Department of Economics and Management ( email )

Contrada Santa Chiara, 50
BRESCIA, BS 25122
Italy

Martin Mosler

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

Niklas Potrafke

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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