NEPA, the ESA, and the Tradeoffs of Interagency Coordination

Chapter 5 IN: Reorganizing Government; A Functional and Dimensional Framework by Alejandro Camacho and Robert Glicksman, New York University Press, 2019.)

UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2020-15

GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020

Posted: 8 Apr 2020

See all articles by Alejandro E. Camacho

Alejandro E. Camacho

University of California, Irvine, School of Law, Center for Land, Environment, and Natural Resources (CLEANR); Center for Progressive Reform

Robert L. Glicksman

George Washington University - Law School

Date Written: April 7, 2020

Abstract

An analysis of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) comparing it to analogous provisions in the Endangered Species Act (ESA) illustrates the value of a careful exploration of interagency coordination-not only the choices that exist for policymakers in deciding the extent to which regulatory authority should be coordinated, but also how policymakers should assess such allocations on a function-by-function basis. Both statutes rely on mechanisms for coordinating certain functions of federal agencies. The chapter argues that NEPA would likely have been more effective if it had extended coordination obligations to information distribution, compliance monitoring, and possibly even project implementation. It suggests that the ESA illustrates one form that formal interagency coordination of implementation and post-decision monitoring might take. The chapter ultimately argues that policymakers should consider the tradeoffs of interagency coordination and independence on a function-by-function basis.

Keywords: National Environmental Policy Act, compliance monitoring, coordination, Endangered Species Act, information distribution, interagency coordination, project implementation

Suggested Citation

Camacho, Alejandro E. and Glicksman, Robert L., NEPA, the ESA, and the Tradeoffs of Interagency Coordination (April 7, 2020). Chapter 5 IN: Reorganizing Government; A Functional and Dimensional Framework by Alejandro Camacho and Robert Glicksman, New York University Press, 2019.) , UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2020-15, GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3570892

Alejandro E. Camacho (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine, School of Law, Center for Land, Environment, and Natural Resources (CLEANR)

401 E. Peltason Drive, Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
United States

Center for Progressive Reform ( email )

500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
United States

Robert L. Glicksman

George Washington University - Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-4641 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=16085

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