Derivative Complexity as a Determinant of Perceived Risk

47 Pages Posted: 5 May 2020 Last revised: 10 Mar 2023

See all articles by Michael T. Durney

Michael T. Durney

University of Iowa

Robert Libby

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management; Cornell SC Johnson College of Business

Felipe Bastos G. Silva

University of Missouri, Columbia

Date Written: February 28, 2023

Abstract

While derivative securities are a critical component of the global economy, the complexity of derivatives is decried as a contributor to financial crises and investor losses. However, derivative complexity is not necessarily related to risk and more complex derivatives may even result in less risk. In this paper, we use five experiments to investigate whether and why derivative complexity is interpreted as a determinant of risk by participants with varying levels of sophistication, including highly experienced professional investors, using both between- and within-participants manipulations of derivative complexity. Results collectively document a robust effect wherein more complex derivatives are evaluated as riskier, contrary to any actual risk differences. Process evidence suggests the effect is driven, at least in part, by attribute substitution. We also document a potential solution via firm disclosure to alleviate this effect, which otherwise might result in misunderstanding of risk based on derivative disclosures required by US GAAP (ASC 815-10-50).

Keywords: derivative securities, attribute substitution, financial complexity, risk perceptions, retail investors, professional investors

JEL Classification: G23, M41, M48, M49

Suggested Citation

Durney, Michael Thomas and Libby, Robert and Silva, Felipe Bastos G., Derivative Complexity as a Determinant of Perceived Risk (February 28, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3570998 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3570998

Michael Thomas Durney (Contact Author)

University of Iowa ( email )

341 Schaeffer Hall
Iowa City, IA 52242-1097
United States

Robert Libby

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-3348 (Phone)
607-254-4590 (Fax)

Cornell SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14850
United States

Felipe Bastos G. Silva

University of Missouri, Columbia ( email )

331 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
5738829905 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
678
Abstract Views
3,439
Rank
82,744
PlumX Metrics