Corporate Governance in China: A Survey

Review of Finance, 2020

68 Pages Posted: 4 May 2020

See all articles by Fuxiu Jiang

Fuxiu Jiang

Renmin University of China - School of Business

Kenneth Kim

Tongji University - School of Economics and Management; SUNY at Buffalo - School of Management

Date Written: April 8, 2020

Abstract

This paper surveys corporate governance in China, as described in a growing literature published in top journals. Unlike the classical vertical agency problems in Western countries, the dominant agency problem in China is the horizontal agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders arising from concentrated ownership structure; thus one cannot automatically apply what is known about the U.S. to China. As these features are also prevalent in many other countries, insights from this survey can also be applied to countries far beyond China. We start by describing controlling shareholder and agency problems in China, and then discuss how law and institutions are particularly important for China, where controlling shareholders have great power. As state-owned enterprises have their own features, we separately discuss their corporate governance. We also briefly discuss corporate social responsibility in China. Finally, we provide an agenda for future research.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Controlling Shareholder; Investor Protection; State-Owned Enterprise; Corporate Social Responsibility

JEL Classification: G30; G34; G38

Suggested Citation

Jiang, Fuxiu and Kim, Kenneth A., Corporate Governance in China: A Survey (April 8, 2020). Review of Finance, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3571247 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3571247

Fuxiu Jiang

Renmin University of China - School of Business ( email )

Beijing
China

Kenneth A. Kim (Contact Author)

Tongji University - School of Economics and Management ( email )

Siping Road 1500
Shanghai, Shanghai 200092
China

SUNY at Buffalo - School of Management ( email )

Jacobs Management Center
Buffalo, NY 14222
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,019
Abstract Views
3,486
rank
27,371
PlumX Metrics