Delegating Pollution Permits

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, forthcoming

35 Pages Posted: 4 May 2020 Last revised: 10 Sep 2021

See all articles by Tapas Kundu

Tapas Kundu

Oslo Metropolitan University

Tore Nilssen

University of Oslo - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 10, 2021

Abstract

We discuss the decision to delegate the regulation of pollution through sales of permits to a
biased expert in a situation where the polluting firm has private information about its technology.
We consider, in particular, constrained delegation where the government puts restrictions on the
amount of pollution that the expert can sell permits for. We find that there is, in general, more
delegation the higher is the probability of the firm being low-cost. This is not in line with the
so-called uncertainty principle, which states that there is more delegation the more uncertainty
the government faces.

Keywords: Bureauracy; Delegation; Pollution standards; Permits

JEL Classification: D82, H23, L51, Q58

Suggested Citation

Kundu, Tapas and Nilssen, Tore, Delegating Pollution Permits (September 10, 2021). Scandinavian Journal of Economics, forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3571348 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3571348

Tapas Kundu

Oslo Metropolitan University ( email )

Pilestredet 35
Oslo, 0167
Norway

HOME PAGE: http://www.tapaskundu.net

Tore Nilssen (Contact Author)

University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway

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