In Living Color: Does In-Person Screening Affect Who Gets Hired?

79 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2020

See all articles by John Manuel Barrios

John Manuel Barrios

Washington University in St. Louis - Olin Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research

Laura M. Giuliano

University of Miami - School of Business Administration - Department of Economics

Andrew J. Leone

University of Miami; Northwestern University

Date Written: March 31, 2020

Abstract

When hiring new workers, employers often screen large numbers of written applications before selecting a subset for more costly, in-person interviews. A large literature suggests that information frictions lead to screening on imperfect quality signals - e.g., educational pedigree and network-based referrals - and that these practices can perpetuate labor-market inequities. In theory, a reduction in the cost of in-person screening could lead to improvements in both efficiency and equity by reducing the use of blunt signals that disadvantage certain groups. We test this hypothesis by studying the introduction of a labor-market intermediary, the Accounting Rookie Camp (ARC), that greatly facilitated in-person screening in the labor market for PhD accountants. Using a novel data set with information on new PhDs, recruiters and market outcomes over 11 years, we estimate difference-in-difference models that leverage variation in the timing of ARC adoption. We find that degree program rank and adviser connectedness are strong predictors of initial job placements, but that their impacts are significantly reduced by participation in ARC. The results suggest that the historical returns to program reputation and adviser networks were driven partly by their signaling values, which were reduced by new the information channels created by ARC. They also indicate that in some respects, ARC adoption helped foster greater diversity in hiring. At the same time, we find no evidence that ARC reduced existing disparities in placements by gender and only weak evidence that it benefited under-represented minorities. Finally, using names to predict nationality and native language, we find that ARC led to worse placements for candidates whose native language is very different from English.

Keywords: Job Matching, Screening, Signaling, Hiring, Networks, Imperfect Information, In-Person Interview, Academic Labor Market

JEL Classification: D83,J7,J23, J44, M510

Suggested Citation

Barrios, John Manuel and Giuliano, Laura M. and Leone, Andrew J. and Leone, Andrew J., In Living Color: Does In-Person Screening Affect Who Gets Hired? (March 31, 2020). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2020-38, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3571595 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3571595

John Manuel Barrios (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis - Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1208
Saint Louis, MO MO 63130-4899
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Laura M. Giuliano

University of Miami - School of Business Administration - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 248126
Coral Gables, FL 33124-6550
United States
305-284-1628 (Phone)

Andrew J. Leone

University of Miami ( email )

School of Business
Coral Gables, FL 33146
United States
305-284-3101 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sbaleone.bus.miami.edu

Northwestern University ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
156
Abstract Views
904
rank
240,432
PlumX Metrics