The Advantage of Resource Queues Over Spot Resource Markets: Decision Coordination in Experiments Under Resource Uncertainty

18 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2020

See all articles by Miguel Alexandre Fonseca

Miguel Alexandre Fonseca

University of Exeter Business School; University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE)

Alexander Pfaff

Duke University - Policy, Economics, Environment; Duke University - Department of Psychology and Neuroscience

Daniel Osgood

Columbia University

Date Written: October 2012

Abstract

Farmers have to make key decisions, such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil, before knowing how much water they will get. They face losses if they make costly decisions but do not receive water, and they may forego profits if they receive water without being prepared. We consider the coordination of farmers’ decisions, such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil when farmers must divide an uncertain water supply. We compare ex‐ante queues (pre‐decision) to an ex‐post spot market (post‐decision & post‐rain) in experiments in rural Brazil and a university in England. Queues have greater coordination success than does the spot market.

Keywords: queue, decision-making under uncertainty, coordination, experiments, field

Suggested Citation

Fonseca, Miguel Alexandre and Pfaff, Alexander and Osgood, Daniel, The Advantage of Resource Queues Over Spot Resource Markets: Decision Coordination in Experiments Under Resource Uncertainty (October 2012). American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 94, Issue 5, pp. 1136-1153, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572282 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aas065

Miguel Alexandre Fonseca (Contact Author)

University of Exeter Business School ( email )

Streatham Court
Xfi Building, Rennes Dr.
Exeter, EX4 4JH
United Kingdom

University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE) ( email )

Campus de Gualtar
Braga, 4710-057
Portugal

Alexander Pfaff

Duke University - Policy, Economics, Environment ( email )

201 Science Drive
Box 90312
Durham, NC 27708-0239
United States

Duke University - Department of Psychology and Neuroscience ( email )

Durham, NC 27708
United States

Daniel Osgood

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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