Taming digital gatekeepers: the more regulatory approach to antitrust law

Stanford-Vienna TTLF Working Paper No. 55; a modified version is forthcoming in Computer Law & Security Review

30 Pages Posted: 6 May 2020 Last revised: 9 Apr 2021

See all articles by Marco Cappai

Marco Cappai

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Giuseppe Colangelo

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics; Stanford Law School; LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management

Date Written: April 10, 2020

Abstract

The economic features of digital markets and the strategic role played by large platforms represent the premises of a significant shift in the approach to the interface between antitrust and regulation, whereas traditionally the former has been seen as preferable to the latter. Indeed, several reports recently issued by authorities, policy makers and academics point to the inefficiency of relying solely on ex post antitrust enforcement and call for a possible ex ante regulatory framework to complement antitrust rules in addressing competition issues in digital contexts. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the invoked regulatory approach reflects the distinctive structural features of digital markets, which would impede self-correction by preventing competition from solving by itself problems associated with them, or whether it is just an enforcement short-cut: that is, an attempt to address some (alleged) anti-competitive practices by dominant online platforms, avoiding hurdles and burdens of the standard antitrust analysis.

Keywords: Online platforms; Digital markets; Antitrust; Regulation; Ex ante prohibitions

JEL Classification: K20; K21; L40; L50

Suggested Citation

Cappai, Marco and Colangelo, Giuseppe, Taming digital gatekeepers: the more regulatory approach to antitrust law (April 10, 2020). Stanford-Vienna TTLF Working Paper No. 55; a modified version is forthcoming in Computer Law & Security Review, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572629 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3572629

Marco Cappai

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Giuseppe Colangelo (Contact Author)

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics ( email )

Via dell'Ateneo Lucano 10
Potenza
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/giuseppecolangelouni/home

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

HOME PAGE: http://law.stanford.edu/transatlantic-technology-law-forum/

LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, Roma 00197
Italy

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