Political Connections, Tax Benefits and Firm Performance: Evidence from China
51 Pages Posted: 6 May 2020
Date Written: 2012
This paper investigates the different effects of political connections on the firm performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 1999 to 2007, we find that private firms with politically connected managers outperform those without such managers, whereas local SOEs with connected managers underperform those without such managers. Moreover, we find that private firms with politically connected managers enjoy tax benefits, whereas local SOEs with politically connected managers are prone to more severe over-investment problems. Our study reconciles the mixed findings of previous studies on the effect of political connections on firm performance.
Keywords: Political Connections; Firm Performance; Tax Benefits; Over-investment; China
JEL Classification: G32; G38; H25
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