Libra: A Concentrate of 'Blockchain Antitrust'

Michigan Law Review Online - 118 Mich. L. Rev. Online. 160, 2020

11 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2020

See all articles by Thibault Schrepel

Thibault Schrepel

Stanford University's Codex Center; Utrecht University School of Law; University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne; Sciences Po

Date Written: April 13, 2020

Abstract

Mark Zuckerberg introduced Libra to the world in June 2019 with the goal of “enabl[ing] a simple global currency and financial infrastructure that empowers billions of people.” Two months after, and without waiting for the project to be launched, the European Commission sent a questionnaire to various parties connected to Libra in order to investigate “potential anti-competitive behaviors.” The U.S. House of Representatives also conducted a series of hearings at the end of October 2019 questioning the intentions behind Libra.

Against this background, Part I of this Essay analyzes the type of governance that Libra is aiming for, as it indicates the nature and frequency of certain anti-competitive risks. Part II offers an assessment of the anti-competitive collusion and monopolization that Libra governance might yield. The discussion concludes by assessing the desirability of the adversarial approach adopted by antitrust agencies and governments thus far.

Keywords: Antitrust, Libra, Block-chain, Facebook, European Commission, Competition

JEL Classification: K21, K2, K22, K23, K1, K29, D23, D21, D22, D29

Suggested Citation

Schrepel, Thibault, Libra: A Concentrate of 'Blockchain Antitrust' (April 13, 2020). Michigan Law Review Online - 118 Mich. L. Rev. Online. 160, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3574684

Thibault Schrepel (Contact Author)

Stanford University's Codex Center ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Utrecht University School of Law ( email )

Janskerkhof 3
Utrecht, 3512 BK
Netherlands

University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

France

Sciences Po ( email )

27 rue Saint-Guillaume
Paris Cedex 07, 75337
France

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
735
Abstract Views
2,869
rank
37,949
PlumX Metrics