Economic Preferences and Compliance in the Social Stress Test of the COVID-19 Crisis

CEGE Working Papers, Number 391 – April 2020

33 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2020 Last revised: 16 Oct 2020

See all articles by Stephan Müller

Stephan Müller

University of Goettingen (Gottingen)

Holger Andreas Rau

University of Goettingen (Gottingen)

Date Written: April 14, 2020

Abstract

We analyze in a survey study whether economic preferences and pre-crisis social responsibility predict social compliance to the policy regulations. Results show that economic preferences are closely related to compliance with policies fighting the crisis. Risk tolerance negatively affects citizens' avoidance of crowds, whereas patience helps to do so and to stay home. Present-biased subjects engage in panic buying. Risk tolerance is negatively related with the fear of COVID-19 and trust positively resonates with positive media perception. Pre-crisis social responsible behavior related to fare evasion, turnout, support of vaccination is also positively related with social compliance. Our findings offer insights which may help policy-makers and organizations to identify risk groups and regions for the allocation of scarce medical or surveillance resources, such as vaccines, masks, and law enforcement.

Keywords: Compliance, COVID-19, Experiment, Preferences, Social Responsibility

JEL Classification: C91, D81, H12, H41

Suggested Citation

Müller, Stephan and Rau, Holger Andreas, Economic Preferences and Compliance in the Social Stress Test of the COVID-19 Crisis (April 14, 2020). CEGE Working Papers, Number 391 – April 2020 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3575633 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3575633

Stephan Müller

University of Goettingen (Gottingen) ( email )

Platz der Gottinger Sieben 3
Gottingen, D-37073
Germany

Holger Andreas Rau (Contact Author)

University of Goettingen (Gottingen) ( email )

Platz der Gottinger Sieben 3
Gottingen, D-37073
Germany

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