Popular Mechanisms

13 Pages Posted: 12 May 2020

See all articles by Mustafa Oguz Afacan

Mustafa Oguz Afacan

Sabanci University

Inácio Bó

University of York - Department of Economics and Related Studies

Date Written: April 15, 2020

Abstract

We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time slots in public tennis courts. Given an allocation, groups of agents who would prefer an alternative allocation might challenge it. An assignment is popular if it is not challenged by another one. By assuming that agents' ability to challenge allocations can be represented by weighted votes, we characterize the conditions under which popular allocations might exist and when these can be implemented via strategy-proof mechanisms. Serial dictatorships that use orderings consistent with the agents' weights are not only strategy-proof and Pareto efficient, but also popular, whenever these assignments exist. We also provide a new characterization for serial dictatorships as the only mechanisms that are popular, strategy-proof, non-wasteful, and satisfy a weak consistency condition.

Keywords: object allocation, voting, strategy-proofness, popular matching

JEL Classification: C78, D47, D63, D74

Suggested Citation

Afacan, Mustafa Oguz and Bó, Inácio, Popular Mechanisms (April 15, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577040 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3577040

Mustafa Oguz Afacan

Sabanci University ( email )

Faculty of Art and Social Sciences
Orhanli Tuzla
İstanbul, 34956
Turkey

Inácio Bó (Contact Author)

University of York - Department of Economics and Related Studies ( email )

Heslington
York, YO1 5DD
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.inaciobo.com

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