Quality Information and Procurement Auction Outcomes: Evidence from a Payment for Ecosystem Services Laboratory Experiment

21 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2020

See all articles by Marc Conte

Marc Conte

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics

Robert M. Griffin

Fordham University

Date Written: April 2017

Abstract

Procuring agencies in conservation auctions typically have more information about the ecosystem service (ES) quality of conservation actions than landowners and can affect auction outcomes by controlling participants’ access to this information. Our induced‐value laboratory auction experiment explores the impact of sellers’ access to ES‐quality information on auction efficiency when the conservation action choice is endogenous to offer formation. We find that providing ES‐quality information allows sellers to identify and submit higher‐quality conservation actions, an effect that counteracts previously identified efficiency losses from information rents.

Keywords: Ecosystem services, information asymmetry, laboratory experiment, procurement auctions, quality auctions

Suggested Citation

Conte, Marc and Griffin, Robert M., Quality Information and Procurement Auction Outcomes: Evidence from a Payment for Ecosystem Services Laboratory Experiment (April 2017). American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 99, Issue 3, pp. 571-591, 2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577043 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aaw096

Marc Conte (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics ( email )

2127 North Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States

Robert M. Griffin

Fordham University

113 West 60th Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

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