A Note on the Core of Auctions with Externalities: No Seller's Deviation

8 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2020

Date Written: April 19, 2020

Abstract

In auctions with externalities, the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and fairness. We show that the core is nonempty if the seller cannot deviate, as a counterpart of the result of the nonemptiness of the core when bidders cannot refuse to pay.

Keywords: core, auction, externalities, justified envy, core-selecting mechanism

JEL Classification: C71, D44, D62

Suggested Citation

Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene), A Note on the Core of Auctions with Externalities: No Seller's Deviation (April 19, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3578728 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3578728

Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong (Contact Author)

University of Bristol ( email )

The Priory Road Complex
Bristol, BS8 1TU
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://eugenejeong.com

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