Electoral Maldistricting

51 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2020 Last revised: 20 Nov 2020

See all articles by Andrei Gomberg

Andrei Gomberg

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Romans Pancs

ITAM, Centro de Investigación Económica

Tridib Sharma

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Centro de Investigacion Economica

Date Written: April 17, 2020

Abstract

We introduce a framework to examine, both theoretically and empirically, electoral maldistricting. Maldistricting is defined as districting in pursuit of a policy at the expense of social welfare. Analysis is performed on the set of implementable (via some district map) legislatures, which are characterized geometrically (via majorization) and in information theoretic terms. The index of maldistricting that we propose aligns with courts' purported motivations for requesting redistricting in the three states that form our case study. The maldistricting we document favors Republicans over Democrats.

Keywords: maldistricting, electoral districting, gerrymandering

JEL Classification: D72, D82

Suggested Citation

Gomberg, Andrei and Pancs, Romans and Sharma, Tridib, Electoral Maldistricting (April 17, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3579221 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3579221

Andrei Gomberg

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Romans Pancs (Contact Author)

ITAM, Centro de Investigación Económica ( email )

Camino a Santa Teresa No. 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Ciudad de México
Mexico

Tridib Sharma

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Centro de Investigacion Economica ( email )

Av. Camino a Santa Teresa #930
Col. Heroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 10370
Mexico D.F.
+525 6284197 (Phone)
+525 6284058 (Fax)

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