An Alternative Explanation for the “Fed Information Effect”

49 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2020 Last revised: 23 Oct 2024

See all articles by Michael Bauer

Michael Bauer

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Eric T. Swanson

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2020

Abstract

High-frequency changes in interest rates around FOMC announcements are a standard method of measuring monetary policy shocks. However, some recent studies have documented puzzling effects of these shocks on private-sector forecasts of GDP, unemployment, or inflation that are opposite in sign to what standard macroeconomic models would predict. This evidence has been viewed as supportive of a “Fed information effect” channel of monetary policy, whereby an FOMC tightening (easing) communicates that the economy is stronger (weaker) than the public had expected. We show that these empirical results are also consistent with a “Fed response to news” channel, in which incoming, publicly available economic news causes both the Fed to change monetary policy and the private sector to revise its forecasts. We provide substantial new evidence that distinguishes between these two channels and strongly favors the latter; for example, (i) regressions that include the previously omitted public economic news, (ii) a new survey that we conduct of Blue Chip forecasters, and (iii) high-frequency financial market responses to FOMC announcements all indicate that the Fed and private sector are simply responding to the same public news, and that there is little if any role for a “Fed information effect”.

Suggested Citation

Bauer, Michael and Swanson, Eric T., An Alternative Explanation for the “Fed Information Effect” (April 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3580571

Michael Bauer (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco ( email )

101 Market Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
United States

Eric T. Swanson

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )

University of California, Irvine
3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States
(949) 824-8305 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ericswanson.org

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
89
Abstract Views
582
Rank
224,978
PlumX Metrics