Government Contracts and Trade Credit

Forthcoming in Advances in Accounting, doi 10.1016/j.adiac.2020.100473

Posted: 5 Jun 2020

See all articles by Hongkang Xu

Hongkang Xu

University of Massachusetts Dartmouth

Mai Dao

University of Toledo - College of Business Administration

Date Written: April 20, 2020

Abstract

This study examines the association between government contracts and firms’ use of trade credit. Firms with government contracts may demand less trade credit because of their lower operational risk, higher firm performance, stronger capacity to generate internal funds, and better access to other sources of financing. On the other hand, government contractors could receive more trade credit extensions from suppliers. We examine a sample of U.S. listed firms from 2000 to 2016 and find that firms with government contracts have a lower level of trade credit. We also find that government contractors make quicker payments for trade credit contracts than other firms. Moreover, we provide empirical evidence of government contractors’ lower levels of operational risk and higher firm performance, which may enable government contractors to generate adequate internal funds for their operations or to obtain other forms of financing at a lower cost and thus lower their demand for trade credit. Incremental to prior research, our study suggests that having government contracts is one of the factors determining trade credit and firms’ financing decisions.

Keywords: government contractor; trade credit; government supplier; short-term financing

Suggested Citation

Xu, Hongkang and Dao, Mai, Government Contracts and Trade Credit (April 20, 2020). Forthcoming in Advances in Accounting, doi 10.1016/j.adiac.2020.100473, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3580935

Hongkang Xu (Contact Author)

University of Massachusetts Dartmouth ( email )

285 Old Westport Road
N Dartmouth, MA 02747-2300
United States

Mai Dao

University of Toledo - College of Business Administration ( email )

2801 W. Bancroft
Toledo, OH 43606
United States

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