False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences

The Philosophical Review 129 (2020), 159-210.

75 Pages Posted: 15 May 2020

See all articles by David Enoch

David Enoch

Hebrew University - The Philosophy Department and the Law School

Date Written: April 20, 2020

Abstract

The starting point regarding consent has to be that it is both extremely important, and that it is often suspicious. In this article, the author tries to make sense of both of these claims, from a largely liberal perspective, tying consent, predictably, to the value of autonomy and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rationality flaw (they are typically formed for reasons of the wrong kind) but that it's not clear that this flaw matters morally or politically. What matters is whether they suffer from an autonomy flaw. To answer this question, the author develops an account of autonomy failure, according to which a preference is nonautonomous if an injustice played an appropriate role in its causal history. The author then discusses the moral implications — and in an initial way, the political ones as well — of proclaiming a preference, or consent based on it, nonautonomous in this way.

Keywords: Liberalism, Consent, Autonomy, Adaptive Preferences, False Consciousness

Suggested Citation

Enoch, David, False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences (April 20, 2020). The Philosophical Review 129 (2020), 159-210.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3580987

David Enoch (Contact Author)

Hebrew University - The Philosophy Department and the Law School ( email )

Mount Scopus
Mount Scopus, IL 91905
Israel

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