The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance: Presentation Slides

29 Pages Posted: 4 May 2020 Last revised: 9 Nov 2020

See all articles by Lucian A. Bebchuk

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Roberto Tallarita

Harvard Law School; Harvard University - Harvard Law School

Date Written: April 20, 2020


The presentation slides in this document provide an overview of our study, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, which will be published by the Cornell Law Review in December 2020.

Corporate purpose is now the focus of a fundamental and heated debate, with rapidly growing support for the proposition that corporations should move from shareholder value maximization to “stakeholder governance” and “stakeholder capitalism.” Our study critically examines the increasingly influential “stakeholderism” view, according to which corporate leaders should give weight not only to the interests of shareholders but also to those of all other corporate constituencies (including employees, customers, suppliers, and the environment). We conduct a conceptual, economic, and empirical analysis of stakeholderism and its expected consequences. We conclude that this view should be rejected, including by those who care deeply about the welfare of stakeholders.

Stakeholderism, we demonstrate, would not benefit stakeholders as its supporters claim. To examine the expected consequences of stakeholderism, we analyze the incentives of corporate leaders, empirically investigate whether they have in the past used their discretion to protect stakeholders, and examine whether recent commitments to adopt stakeholderism can be expected to bring about a meaningful change. Our analysis concludes that acceptance of stakeholderism should not be expected to make stakeholders better off.

Furthermore, we show that embracing stakeholderism could well impose substantial costs on shareholders, stakeholders, and society at large. Stakeholderism would increase the insulation of corporate leaders from shareholders, reduce their accountability, and hurt economic performance. In addition, by raising illusory hopes that corporate leaders would on their own provide substantial protection to stakeholders, stakeholderism would impede or delay reforms that could bring meaningful protection to stakeholders. Stakeholderism would therefore be contrary to the interests of the stakeholders it purports to serve and should be opposed by those who take stakeholder interests seriously.

The document is based on presentations slides we prepared for various presentations of our study, including at the University of Chicago, Columbia Law School, Harvard Law School, the Big Debate on Stakeholder Capitalism at Oxford, and the ECGI-Stockholm Conference on Sustainable Finance.

Our study on The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance is part of a larger research project of the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance on stakeholder capitalism and stakeholderism. Another part of this research project is For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita.

Keywords: corporate purpose, corporate social responsibility, stakeholders, stakeholder governance, stakeholder capitalism, corporate constituencies, enlightened shareholder value, corporate governance, Business Roundtable, constituency statutes, entrenchment, accountability, managerialism

JEL Classification: D21, G32, G34, G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Tallarita, Roberto, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance: Presentation Slides (April 20, 2020). Available at SSRN: or

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)


European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Roberto Tallarita

Harvard Law School ( email )

1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Harvard University - Harvard Law School ( email )

1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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