Differentiating Centralization and Overlap in Swap Regulation

Chapter IN: Reorganizing Government; A Functional and Dimensional Framework by Alejandro Camacho and Robert Glicksman, New York University Press, 2019

UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2020-16

GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-65

Posted: 21 Apr 2020 Last revised: 16 Sep 2020

See all articles by Alejandro E. Camacho

Alejandro E. Camacho

University of California, Irvine, School of Law, Center for Land, Environment, and Natural Resources (CLEANR); Center for Progressive Reform

Robert L. Glicksman

George Washington University - Law School

Date Written: April 20, 2020

Abstract

This chapter explains how legislative changes to, and the broader commentary on, US derivatives regulation illustrate the value of parsing the overlap/distinct and centralization/decentralization dimensions in assessing the tradeoffs of regulatory allocations. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission have been tasked with decentralized authority over securities and futures, respectively. Over time, their jurisdictions have increasingly overlapped as the futures and securities markets converged. Reorganization proposals and legislation to correct perceived problems with the overlapping, decentralized regulatory regime (such as Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act) have usually failed to parse the various tradeoffs between overlap and distinct or between centralized and decentralized authority. By limiting their analysis, policymakers and observers of derivatives regulation may have misdiagnosed problems with the existing allocation or missed potential opportunities to craft different regulatory configurations that might have better accommodated policy tradeoffs or been more politically viable.

Keywords: Commodity Futures Trading Commission, derivatives regulation, Dodd-Frank Act, regulatory allocations, Securities and Exchange Commission

Suggested Citation

Camacho, Alejandro E. and Glicksman, Robert L., Differentiating Centralization and Overlap in Swap Regulation (April 20, 2020). Chapter IN: Reorganizing Government; A Functional and Dimensional Framework by Alejandro Camacho and Robert Glicksman, New York University Press, 2019 , UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2020-16, GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-65, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3581303

Alejandro E. Camacho (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine, School of Law, Center for Land, Environment, and Natural Resources (CLEANR)

401 E. Peltason Drive, Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
United States

Center for Progressive Reform ( email )

500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
United States

Robert L. Glicksman

George Washington University - Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-4641 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=16085

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