Differentiating Centralization and Coordination in National Intelligence after 9/11

Chapter IN: Reorganizing Government; A Functional and Dimensional Framework by Alejandro Camacho and Robert Glicksman, New York University Press, 2019

UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2020-17

GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-64

Posted: 21 Apr 2020 Last revised: 16 Sep 2020

See all articles by Alejandro E. Camacho

Alejandro E. Camacho

University of California, Irvine, School of Law, Center for Land, Environment, and Natural Resources (CLEANR); Center for Progressive Reform

Robert L. Glicksman

George Washington University - Law School

Date Written: April 20, 2020

Abstract

This chapter uses legislative changes in the structure of federal intelligence information management in the wake of 9/11 to explore problems that arise from the failure to distinguish the centralization/decentralization and coordination/independence dimensions of regulatory authority. According to the 9/11 Commission, created to investigate the intelligence community's inability to thwart the terrorist attacks, the failure of agencies such as the FBI and the CIA to share information with each other, attributable largely to a lack of coordinated information management, was a major contributing factor. The chapter contends that Congress and the 9/11 Commission's report-on which the former relied in 2004 in enacting the most comprehensive structural reform of the intelligence community in fifty years-erred by seeking to address coordination failures by centralizing aspects of the intelligence community through the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. In addition, neither Congress nor the Commission distinguished clearly among three different information management functions-generation, dissemination, and analysis-in assessing past intelligence failures or selecting reorganizational responses to them. The chapter then uses the intelligence information management context to explore the policy tradeoffs of situating authority along both the centralization/decentralization and coordination/independence dimensions for each information management function.

Keywords: 9/11 Commission, Intelligence Community, Intelligence Failures, Information Management, Office Of The Director Of National Intelligence, US Congress

Suggested Citation

Camacho, Alejandro E. and Glicksman, Robert L., Differentiating Centralization and Coordination in National Intelligence after 9/11 (April 20, 2020). Chapter IN: Reorganizing Government; A Functional and Dimensional Framework by Alejandro Camacho and Robert Glicksman, New York University Press, 2019 , UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2020-17, GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-64, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3581316

Alejandro E. Camacho (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine, School of Law, Center for Land, Environment, and Natural Resources (CLEANR)

401 E. Peltason Drive, Suite 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
United States

Center for Progressive Reform ( email )

500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
United States

Robert L. Glicksman

George Washington University - Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-4641 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=16085

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