Governance and Service Delivery in the Middle East and North Africa

103 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 2020

See all articles by Adam Harris

Adam Harris

University of Gothenburg

Kristen Kao

University of Gothenburg; University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Political Science

Ellen Lust

University of Gothenburg

Jens Ewald

University of Gothenburg - Department of Economics

Petter Holmgren

University of Gothenburg

Date Written: 2017

Abstract

This paper explores the clientelistic equilibrium that remains prevalent in much of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region during the post-independence period, undermining service delivery and creating inequality in access. Political institutions and social practices that shape incentives for policymakers, service providers, and citizens create what can be called a potentially tenuous, “clientelistic equilibrium.” Service delivery is influenced by political institutions that allow for the capture of public jobs and service networks, and by social institutions that call upon individuals to respond more readily to members of their social networks than to others. The result is poor quality service delivery (e.g., absenteeism, insufficient effort), difficulties in access (e.g., need for bribes, connections), and inequalities in the provision of services.

Keywords: political institutions, MENA, service delivery, clientelistic equilibrium, service networks, service provision

Suggested Citation

Harris, Adam and Kao, Kristen and Lust, Ellen and Ewald, Jens and Holmgren, Petter, Governance and Service Delivery in the Middle East and North Africa (2017). Program on Governance and Local Development Working Paper No. 10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3581800 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3581800

Adam Harris

University of Gothenburg ( email )

Viktoriagatan 30
Göteborg, 405 30
Sweden

Kristen Kao

University of Gothenburg ( email )

Viktoriagatan 30
Göteborg, 405 30
Sweden

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Political Science

Los Angeles, CA
United States

Ellen Lust (Contact Author)

University of Gothenburg ( email )

Viktoriagatan 30
Göteborg, 405 30
Sweden

Jens Ewald

University of Gothenburg - Department of Economics ( email )

Sweden

Petter Holmgren

University of Gothenburg

Viktoriagatan 30
Göteborg, 405 30
Sweden

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