Doctors Without Borders? Re-Licensing Requirements and Negative Selection in the Market for Physicians

38 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2004

See all articles by Adriana D. Kugler

Adriana D. Kugler

McCourt School of Public Policy ; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Robert M. Sauer

University of London - Royal Holloway College

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2002

Abstract

Re-licensing requirements for professionals that move across borders are widespread. In this paper, we measure the effects of occupational licensing by exploiting an immigrant physician re-training assignment rule. Instrumental variables and quantile treatment effects estimates indicate large returns to acquiring an occupational license and negative selection into licensing status. We also develop a general model of optimal license acquisition which, together with the empirical results, suggests that stricter re-licensing requirements may not only lead to practitioner rents but also to lower average quality of service in the market for physicians.

Keywords: Occupational Licensing, Immigrant Physicians, Negative Selection

JEL Classification: J24, J31, J44

Suggested Citation

Kugler, Adriana Debora and Sauer, Robert M., Doctors Without Borders? Re-Licensing Requirements and Negative Selection in the Market for Physicians (November 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=358222 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.358222

Adriana Debora Kugler (Contact Author)

McCourt School of Public Policy ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Robert M. Sauer

University of London - Royal Holloway College ( email )

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London, TW20 0EX
United Kingdom

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