Corporate Social Responsibility Strategies in Nigeria: A Tinged Shareholder Model

26 Pages Posted: 19 May 2020

Date Written: April 22, 2020


Purpose: This paper examines two important issues in CSR scholarship. First, the study problematizes corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a form of self-regulation. Second, the research explores how CSR strategies can enable firms to recognise and internalise their externalities while preserving shareholder value.

Design/Methodology: This study employs a tinged shareholder model to understand the interactions between an organisation’s CSR approach and the effect of relevant externalities on its CSR outcomes. In doing this, we adopt the case study qualitative methodology, relying on data from one Fidelity Bank, Nigeria.

Findings: By articulating a tripodal thematic model – governance of externalities in the economy, governance of externalities in the social system and governance of externalities in the environment, this paper demonstrates how an effective combination of these themes triggers the emergence of a robust CSR culture in an organisation.

Research Implications: This research advances our understanding of the implication of internalising externalities in the CSR literature in a relatively under-researched context – Nigeria.

Originality: Our data allows us to present a governance model that will enable managers to focus on their overarching objective of shareholder value without the challenges of pursuing multiple and sometimes conflicting goals that typically create negative impacts to non-shareholding stakeholders.

Keywords: Shareholder primacy; Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); Corporate externalities; Nigeria; Tinged shareholder theory

Suggested Citation

Adegbite, Emmanuel, Corporate Social Responsibility Strategies in Nigeria: A Tinged Shareholder Model (April 22, 2020). Available at SSRN: or

Emmanuel Adegbite (Contact Author)

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics