Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self‐Reporting Mechanism

12 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2020

See all articles by Lars Gårn Hansen

Lars Gårn Hansen

University of Copenhagen - Institute of Food and Resource Economics

Frank Jensen

University of Copenhagen - Institute of Food and Resource Economics

Urs Steiner Brandt

University of Southern Denmark

Niels Vestergaard

Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark

Date Written: November 2006

Abstract

To solve the problem of illegal landings this article proposes a new tax mechanism based on the regulator's own aggregate catch estimates and ex ante self‐reports of planned catch by fishermen. We show that the mechanism avoids illegal landings while ensuring (nearly) optimal exploitation and generating (nearly) correct entry and exit incentives. Finally we simulate the mechanism for the Danish cod fishery in Kattegat to obtain a rough indicator of the size of the tax. It turns out that the average tax payment as a percentage of profit is surprisingly low.

Keywords: entry and exit incentives, fisheries, illegal landings, optimal exploitation, self-reports, tax mechanism

Suggested Citation

Hansen, Lars Gårn and Jensen, Frank and Brandt, Urs Steiner and Vestergaard, Niels, Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self‐Reporting Mechanism (November 2006). American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 88, Issue 4, pp. 974-985, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3582926 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2006.00910.x

Lars Gårn Hansen (Contact Author)

University of Copenhagen - Institute of Food and Resource Economics ( email )

Rolighedsvej 25
Copenhagen, 1958
Denmark

Frank Jensen

University of Copenhagen - Institute of Food and Resource Economics ( email )

Rolighedsvej 25
Copenhagen, 1958
Denmark

Urs Steiner Brandt

University of Southern Denmark

Campusvej 55
DK-5230 Odense, 5000
Denmark

Niels Vestergaard

Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark ( email )

6700 Esbjerg
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://www.sdu.dk/staff/nv

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