Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self‐Reporting Mechanism
12 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2020
Date Written: November 2006
Abstract
To solve the problem of illegal landings this article proposes a new tax mechanism based on the regulator's own aggregate catch estimates and ex ante self‐reports of planned catch by fishermen. We show that the mechanism avoids illegal landings while ensuring (nearly) optimal exploitation and generating (nearly) correct entry and exit incentives. Finally we simulate the mechanism for the Danish cod fishery in Kattegat to obtain a rough indicator of the size of the tax. It turns out that the average tax payment as a percentage of profit is surprisingly low.
Keywords: entry and exit incentives, fisheries, illegal landings, optimal exploitation, self-reports, tax mechanism
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Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self‐Reporting Mechanism
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