In Defence of the Paris Agreement’s Compliance System: The Case for Facilitative Compliance

Abstract

This paper is part of a debate on the effectiveness of the compliance system under the Paris Agreement on climate change. It makes the case in support of the facilitative approach to compliance adopted in Paris and implemented through the Paris Rulebook. The paper argues that an enforcement based approach would have been counter productive given the architecture of the Paris Agreement.

The paper concludes that whatever the merits of an enforcement-based compliance system may be in other MEAs or other international regimes, it has no place in the architecture of the Paris Agreement. A strong compliance system would undermine efforts to motivate parties to increase the ambition of their commitments and actions over time. It would significantly increase the risk of parties leaving the regime. The compliance system negotiated is well suited to the architecture of the Paris Agreement, and strikes an appropriate balance between identifying important compliance issues and keeping parties motivated to remain part of the regime and to take on more ambitious commitments over time.

Keywords: compliance, climate change, commitments, obligations, facilitation, enforcement